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Appellate Review of Judicial
Disqualification Decisions in the
Federal Courtst
By KAREN NELSON MOORE*
Litigants in the federal district courts are more frequently asking
judges to disqualify themselves from hearing cases on the grounds of
alleged bias, prejudice, or personal interest in the suit. Often the dis-
trict judge denies the motion for judicial disqualification, and the dis-
appointed party immediately seeks appellate review. Because the
disqualification decision, whether a grant or a denial, is not a final deci-
sion on the merits of the case, it normally cannot be appealed immedi-
ately unless it comes within one of the limited exceptions to the final
order doctrine or some other theory warranting immediate review of an
interlocutory order.
Whether an appellate court should immediately review an inter-
locutory decision concerning judicial disqualification depends on the
balance between two types of fundamental policies. On the one hand,
the policies of economy and efficiency of appellate review and of re-
spect for the trial court mandate that the appellate court delay review
of any issue, including judicial disqualification, until the lower court
reaches a final judgment. On the other hand, the question of judicial
disqualification goes to the heart of the judicial process and may so
fundamentally affect the judgment that immediate review is necessary
to protect the adversely affected party and the judicial process itself.
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question of immediate review of judicial disqualification decisions.'
t © Copyright 1984 Karen Nelson Moore
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Law School. A.B., 1970, J.D., 1973,
Harvard University.
1. The Court, however, has held that the collateral order doctrine is not usually avail-
able to obtain review of counsel disqualification orders, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), and this decision arguably has decreased the likelihood of
successful use of the doctrine in the judicial disqualification context. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 158-96 for a discussion of the collateral order doctrine as applied to judicial
disqualifications.
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The federal courts of appeals are divided regarding the reviewability of
judicial disqualification orders under the collateral order doctrine,
writs of mandamus or prohibition, or other theories.2 Indeed, many
courts and commentators simply assume that immediate review is pos-
sible under some doctrine and proceed directly to the merits of the
issue.
This Article addresses whether and under what circumstances an
appellate court should immediately review an interlocutory decision
concerning judicial disqualification. It suggests that the reviewability
of a judicial disqualification decision must be analyzed in terms of the
underlying basis for the judicial disqualification motion. The Article
establishes two models of judicial disqualification decisions, based on
the statutory grounds for judicial disqualification.3 The Article then
analyzes the suitability of mandamus, the collateral order doctrine, and
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as devices to gain immediate
appellate review of cases in each model. The Article concludes that
under each model some form of immediate appellate review is war-
ranted, although the type of review depends upon the characteristics of
the model involved.
The Statutory Grounds for Disqualification of Federal District
Judges: A Paradigmatic Approach
Under current federal statutes two broad types of situations war-
rant judicial disqualification: first, personal bias or prejudice, whether
in fact or appearance;4 second, personal involvement by the judge in
the matter in controversy.5 Neither the statutes nor their legislative his-
tories indicate whether immediate appellate court review of district
court disqualification decisions is appropriate.
Since 1792, federal statutes have required a district judge to with-
draw from hearing a case if it appears that the judge is "concerned in
interest," or had been of counsel for either party.6 The modem statu-
2. The focus of this Article is on the federal courts, because states vary enormously in
their substantive standards for disqualification and may not be circumscribed by the final
order limitation prescribed by federal law in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
3. The term disqualification is used throughout the Article to describe the situation in
which a judge is asked by a party to withdraw from hearing a case. Although the term
"recuse" is often used as a synonym, it technically refers to a voluntary decision of the judge
to step down. See Frank, LDisqualocation of Judges. In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a), 455(b)(1) (1982).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1982).
6. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455
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tory framework first emerged in 1911, when, in the course of codifica-
tion, Congress separately provided for disqualification on the basis of a
judge's relationship with the matter in controversy and disqualification
on the basis of the judge's personal bias or prejudice. 7 The provision
addressing a judge's relationship with the matter in controversy was
drawn largely from the old statutory language,8 whereas the bias provi-
sions were essentially new.9
The bias provision, 28 U.S.C. § 144, requires a district judge to
remove himself whenever a party "makes and files a timely and suffi-
cient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party."' 10 The party may fie only one affidavit in a judicial disqualifi-
cation case and must include in the affidavit a statement of facts and
reasons for believing there is bias. Moreover, the statute requires coun-
sel to certify that the affidavit is made in good faith."
The relatively general language of section 144 led to a substantial
amount of litigation concerning the scope of inquiry into the facts
stated in the affidavit and other aspects of its sufficiency, the nature of
bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant disqualification, and the appro-
priate timing of review of the trial judge's determination.' 2 The
Supreme Court has only twice focused on these issues. In Berger v.
United States,'3 the Court held that the district judge must determine
only the sufficiency of the affidavit, not the truth of the allegations con-
tained therein.' 4 In Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co.,' 5 the Court
held that the facts stated in the affidavit must demonstrate bias or
prejudice, not simply adverse rulings in the course of the proceedings.16
(1982)). The language was modified in 1821 to require disqualification also when the judge
was "so related to, or connected with, either party, as to render it improper for him, in his
opinion, to sit." Act of March 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643. Under both Acts, the circuit court
was to take jurisdiction of the case. Id
7. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 20-21, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144, 455 (1982)).
8. Id § 20.
9. Id. § 21.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
11. ld.
12. See generally Note, Disqual'Fcation of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1966).
13. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
14. Id at 36.
15. 230 U.S. 35 (1913).
16. Id. at 43-44. See also Berger, 255 U.S. 22, 34 (1921) (interpreting the American
Steel Barrelcase to require that allegations of bias must be based on facts occurring before
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The Court has not definitively resolved the issue of the appropriate
time for review of the trial judge's determination.
In 1974 Congress substantially amended the personal involvement
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 455, in an attempt to clarify the kind of involve-
ment with the matter in controversy that warrants judicial disqualifica-
tion. 17 Revised section 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify
himself in two situations.' First, a judge must disqualify himself "in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned."' 9 According to the legislative history, this provision estab-
lishes an objective standard that operates regardless of actual bias, 20
although there must be some reasonable basis for alleging bias. 21 Sec-
ond, a judge must disqualify himself when one of five specified circum-
stances exists:22 (1) the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding"; 23 (2) the judge was involved with the mat-
ter while in private practice either directly or through an associate or
partner;24 (3) the judge was involved with the matter while in govern-
ment service;25 (4) the judge has a financial interest of any size in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party whether personally or as a
trial). Both Berger and American SteelBarrelcontain dicta concerning reviewability ofjudi-
cial disqualification decisions. See infra notes 69-76 & accompanying text.
17. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982)).
18. These amended provisions largely track the terms of Canon 3C of the Code of
Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, adopted by that Association in 1972 and
approved for application to federal judges by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6351, 6352-53 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
Prior to the 1974 amendment, § 455 simply provided that
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material
witness, or is related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), amended by28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). The report of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee is virtually identical to the House Report. See S. REP. No. 419, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
20. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5, 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6354-55, 6358.
21. See id. at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6355.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1982). The judge may not obtain a waiver of disqualification
from the parties unless the basis for disqualification is solely encompassed in § 455(a), which
deals with cases where impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Id. § 455(e).
23. Id § 455(b)(1).
24. Id § 455(b)(2).
25. Id. § 455(b)(3).
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fiduciary, or through a spouse or minor child,26 or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the litigation;27 and (5) the judge
or a close relative is involved as a party, officer, witness, lawyer, or
holder of any other position of interest in the matter.28 This second
portion of the statute reiterates that the existence of personal bias or
prejudice is a mandatory ground for disqualification,29 but also deline-
ates particular relationships that require disqualification because of an
inherent likelihood to give the appearance of bias.
The revision of section 455 complicated the relationship between
the two key statutory provisions. Before the revision, cases involving
allegations of bias and prejudice were governed by section 144,
whereas allegations of a disqualifying relationship between the judge
and the matter in controversy were governed by section 455, which has
less complicated procedural provisions. The 1974 amendment, how-
ever, broadened section 455 to cover bias as well. Section 455 now
prohibits a judge from hearing a case not only when he "has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party,"' 30 but also when "his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 3' While the proscription of actual
(subjective) bias and prejudice tracks the language of section 144,32 the
proscription of objective bias creates a new and more easily established
ground for obtaining disqualification, the appearance of bias. The leg-
islative history of section 455 provides no guidance regarding the dif-
ferences and overlap between the two statutes.33
26. Id. § 455(b)(4). The 1974 amendment extended the scope of this section of the
statute. Under the old language of § 455 a judge was proscribed from hearing a matter in
which he had a "substantial" financial interest. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), amended by 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Under the amended statute, he is proscribed from sitting when he has
financial interest of any degree. The legislative history indicates a clear congressional intent
to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity in determining what is substantial and to avoid potential
due process problems that might arise no matter how small a direct economic or financial
interest the judge might have. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6356.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982).
28. Id. § 455(b)(5).
29. Id § 455(b)(1) (generally reiterating bias and prejudice grounds stated in § 144).
30. Id § 455(b)(1).
31. Id. § 455(a).
32. Section 144 requires that a judge shall not hear a case when he has a "personal bias
or prejudice" either in favor of or against a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
33. For example, the House Report on § 455 does not address the problem of the rela-
tionship between § 455 and § 144, except by including a letter from the Department of Jus-
tice which suggests, inter alia, incorporation of the timeliness requirements of § 144 into
§ 455. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6358. In the Senate hearings, Senator Bayh made brief reference to the advisability
of amending § 144 to permit one preemptory challenge of a judge, but Congress did not act
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Litigants have begun to use the bias provisions of sections 455(a)
and (b)(1) in conjunction with34 or in place of 35 section 144. This reli-
ance on section 455 is not surprising because that section presents liti-
gants with fewer obstacles to invoking its application. First, the
requirements of section 144 for a sufficient and timely affidavit or a
certificate of good cause do not appear to govern either section 455(a)
or section 455(b)(1). Parties proceeding under section 144 have found
these requirements difficult to satisfy.36 Second, and perhaps more im-
portant, the appearance-of-bias test under section 455(a) is easier to
satisfy than the bias-in-fact test of sections 1443 7 and 455(b)(1). Faced
with the difficulty of establishing a judge's state of mind, courts have
not always required direct proof of a judge's bias even under section
144.38 Under that section, however, courts have required proof of more
than a mere reasonable question about impartiality which is sufficient
under section 455(a).39 Although sections 144 and 455(b)(1) both re-
quire a showing ofpersonalbias with respect to aparty, section 455(a)
upon this suggestion. See Judicial Disqualfication, Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6-7, 12-13, 76 (1973).
34. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Bell v. Chandler,
569 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1058 (1976).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla, 626 F.2d 177 (Ist Cir. 1980); Cleveland v.
Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); Webbe v. McGhie
Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977).
36. See, e.g., Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1980) (§ 144 requirements were
not satisfied because the plaintiff had failed to sign the affidavit as § 144 expressly requires);
Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1970) (affidavit by plaintifi's attorney did not consti-
tute an affidavit by a party to the action as required by § 144); In re United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 276 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1960); Williams v. Kent, 216 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1954); Foster v.
Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909 (1949); Minnesota & Ontario
Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1934).
Moreover, § 455(b)(1), unlike § 144, does not require a party to make and file an affida-
vit of prejudice, but rather seems to make disqualification an issue which the judge is man-
dated to notice and determine even if the parties are silent. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (1982)
("A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and
make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his household.").
37. Although it has never been clearly established that § 144 required bias-in-fact, the
statutory language certainly points in that direction.
38. See, e.g., Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692, 695-96 (9th Cir.
1951). See generally Note, supra note 12, at 1445-47.
39. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972);
Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 798-800 (2d. Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Disqualifica-
tion of Federal Judgesfor Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 236, 242-46 (1978).
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more broadly prohibits participation of a judge whose impartiality
might be questioned.
Models For Classifying Judicial Disqualification Decisions
Model I
The situations giving rise to disqualification under these two stat-
utes, which are the basis for virtually all judicial disqualification mo-
tions,40 can be classified according to two models or paradigms that aid
the determination of when disqualification is mandated. Under Model
I, disqualification is required if the judge has engaged in certain rela-
tionships with the matter in controversy that are proscribed under sec-
tions 455(b)(2)-(b)(5). Thus, disqualification should ensue if the judge
or a close relative has been counsel, witness, party, or officer of a party
in the matter in controversy;41 if the judge, his spouse, or his minor
child has any financial interest in the matter in controversy or in a
party;42 or if the judge or a close relative has any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
43
Each of these relationships presents the possibility of bias and is gener-
ally capable of objective documentation. For example, relatively little
subjective judgment or discretion is necessary to determine whether a
judge owns stock in a corporation that is a party, holds a position as an
officer or director of a corporate party, or has personal knowledge of
evidentiary facts tending to make it likely that he would be a witness.44
Two recent cases illustrate the Model I situation. In In re Rod-
gets45 the trial judge's former partner had represented during the pe-
riod of their partnership a client whose interests were involved in the
case. The judge's former partner and his client were likely to be called
as witnesses, although they were not counsel or parties in the case. The
40. Cases are rarely brought on nonstatutory grounds. A noteworthy exception is
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (sustaining a constitutional due process
challenge to a judge hearing a case in which, due to a concurrent executive position, he had
a financial interest in assessing large fines). See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
(finding a due process violation in allowing a trial judge to receive, in addition to his regular
salary, money from fines levied by him).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) (1982). Model I encompasses the portion of
§ 455(b)(1) that proscribes involvement by a judge having "personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982).
43. Id §§ 455(b)(4), (b)(5).
44. Model I cases, however, may raise substantial issues of statutory construction in
determining whether specific factual circumstances constitute a proscribed relationship. See
infra notes 205-07 & accompanying text.
45. 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
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court of appeals held that section 455(b)(2), which concerns disqualifi-
cation based on former private practice, mandated disqualification
under these circumstances. 46 In another case exemplifying Model I,
SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan,47 the brother of the district judge was a
senior partner in the law firm representing one of the parties. The
judge's brother was not a participant in the litigation, but had financial
and other interests in the success of his firm. Although the motion to
disqualify was based on the brother's role as counsel as well as his in-
terests in the matter, the court of appeals ordered the disqualification
simply due to the brother's interests in the matter.48 In both these
cases, the alleged ground for disqualification could be established read-
ily by independent objective evidence.
Model II
Model II encompasses the bias and prejudice provisions requiring
disqualification. It consists of two subcategories: Type A, bias-in-fact,
includes situations in which the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party;' 49 Type B, appearance-of-bias, includes situations
in which a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 50
The statutory language applicable to Type A cases narrowly proscribes
personal bias only with respect to parties, while the language governing
Type B cases broadly proscribes the appearance of partiality.5'
Connelly v. United States District Court52 exemplifies Type A, bias-
in-fact. In Connelly the defendant was charged with organizing the
Communist Party to overthrow the United States government. Out of
court the judge told the defendant's attorney that he was "sorry" to see
the attorney "getting mixed up with these Commies. ' '53 The judge, a
former United States Attorney who had prosecuted some of the de-
fendant's alleged co-conspirators, had made similar comments on other
occasions. The Ninth Circuit held that these statements were sufficient
46. Id at 1197.
47. 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 116-17. Disqualification also was ordered on the basis of § 455(a), the ap-
pearance of partiality. Id at 117.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). This language is essentially identical to § 144's requirement
that a judge step down if a party files a sufficient affidavit that the judge "has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." See supra note 10 & ac-
companying text.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
51. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(b)(1) (1982) with 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
52. 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).
53. Id. at 694.
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to warrant disqualification under the bias-in-fact provisions.5 4
Type B, apparent bias, was unsuccessfully claimed in In re United
States.5 5 The prosecution charged the trial judge with the appearance
of partiality because the judge and the defendant, a state senator, had a
prior association. The trial judge had had a close professional and per-
sonal relationship with the former state governor, who had been the
subject of a legislative investigation several years earlier. The trial
judge and the defendant in the pending criminal extortion case had
assisted the governor during that investigation. The court of appeals
denied the prosecution's petition for writ of mandamus, on the ground
that the prior association between the judge and the defendant did not
demonstrate the appearance of partiality to a reasonable observer.56
Apparent bias was successfully claimed, however, in United States v.
Ritter.5 7 The court concluded in Ritter that the judge's partiality might
reasonably be questioned because of comments he made favorable to
one counsel and disparaging of the opposing counsel.5 8
Connely, In re United States, and Ritter illustrate that, unlike the
easily determinable factual relationships involved in Model I cases,
Model II disqualification turns on assessment of the judge's actual or
apparent perceptions, feelings, and state of mind. Mood and state of
mind, viewed either subjectively or objectively, are often difficult to
ascertain and to evaluate. Considerable judgment and inference may
be necessary to determine whether bias exists. Even the objective ap-
pearance-of-bias standard presents the difficulty of deciding what facts
reasonable people would view as constituting bias.5 9
Thus, the issues presented by the two models differ primarily in
their susceptibility to objective documentation and in the extent to
which discretion may be exercised in ruling on disqualification. These
factors should be critical in determining whether immediate appellate
review is available.
Reviewability of Disqualification Orders: The
Theoretical Grounds
Disqualification motions are properly made and determined early
54. Id at 696.
55. 666 F.2d 690 (Ist Cir. 1981).
56. Id at 697.
57. 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1058 (1976).
58. 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1976).
59. See generaly Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintaining an
Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 863, 871.
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in the case, almost always before trial.60 Under current interpretations
the decision of a challenged judge to grant the disqualification motion
generally is not reviewable because a party is not entitled to have a
particular judge decide a particular case.61 This Article focuses on
those cases in which the district judge denies the motion to disqualify
himself, and considers whether review of such rulings should be imme-
diate or should await the final disposition of the case by the challenged
judge.
Under the final order doctrine 62 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291,63 a denial
of disqualification is not immediately appealable; review must await
the final judgment in the entire case.64 Although the Supreme Court
has not yet resolved the issue, many courts of appeals have avoided the
60. Section 144 includes a requirement of timeliness. Although § 455 does not mention
any timeliness standard, it is sensible to raise the disqualification issue early in the case to
obtain a new judge as soon as possible and to avoid possible claims of laches and unwar-
ranted delay. Because the disqualification is mandatory under § 455(b), disqualification
issues occasionally arise after protracted litigation, causing particular difficulty. See, e.g., In
re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982), afrdfor absence of quorum sub
nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). In a few cases disqualifica-
tion under § 455 has been denied due to delay in raising the issue. See, e.g., Delesdernier v.
Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 122-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982) (§ 455(a) challenge
first raised on appeal after second trial was untimely); In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 933
(2d Cir. 1980) (§ 455 motion, made a decade after case was filed and while decision was
pending, was untimely). But see SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir.
1977) (no requirement of timeliness for filing of § 455(b) motion).
61. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 644 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 877 (1982); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 1981). See gener-
ally 13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDEAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3553 at 652-55 (1984).
Grants of disqualification have been held immediately reviewable, however, under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). See, e.g., In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794
(10th Cir. 1980); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976); Kelley v.
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 479 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1973). Some recent cases have
suggested mandamus as an appropriate mechanism for review of a grant of disqualification.
See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982), a f'dfor absence ofquorum
sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); In re Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding jurisdiction under both § 1292(b)
and supervisory mandamus power). In all but the Kelley case, the scope of the language of
the disqualification statute rather than the application of the statute to the asserted facts was
involved. See infra text accompanying notes 205-11.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (providing that courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from allfinal decisions of the district courts") (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978); Scar-
rella v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885
(1976); Dubnoff v. Goldstein, 385 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Watkins, 331 F.2d 192 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964); Collier v. Picard, 237
F.2d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 1956); In re Chicago Rapid Transit, 200 F,2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1952).
These cases are consistent with the Supreme Court's view that a final decision "ends the
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final order doctrine by allowing review through writ of mandamus. On
occasion the collateral order exception to the final order doctrine and
the statutory interlocutory appeal provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
have been invoked to allow immediate review. The propriety of these
mechanisms is evaluated below in light of the characteristics of Model I
and Model II disqualification orders.
Review by Mandamus
The'writ of mandamus65 has been the most successful of these
mechanisms for obtaining immediate review of judicial disqualification
decisions. A majority of circuit courts has held that mandamus is
available in appropriate cases to review a trial judge's decision not to
disqualify himself.66 Even in these circuits, however, the courts usually
deny the writ on the ground that the factual circumstances do not war-
rant exercise of the discretion to issue the writ.67 A minority of the
circuits holds that mandamus is not available to obtain review of judi-
cial disqualification orders.68
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
65. See infra notes 77-78 & accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Rodgers, 537
F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 976 (1972); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Union Leader
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Connelly v. United
States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951); Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913).
Cf. Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
67. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690 (Ist Cir. 1981); In re IBM Corp., 618
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Scarrella v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207,
1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976); Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.
1970); In re Union Leader Corp. 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961);
Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909 (1949); Dilling v.
United States, 142 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
68. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits take a chary view of mandamus. The Sev-
enth Circuit holds that mandamus is inappropriate, at least when the bias ground for dis-
qualification is invoked. See, eg., Action Realty Co. v. Will, 427 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir.
1970); Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1954). See infra note 114.
The Third Circuit's opinions are confusing, but appear to deny the availability of the
writ. In Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3rd Cir. 1958), the court held that the remedy of
appeal of final judgment was adequate and denied the writ. The court also stated that the
circumstances did not warrant the exercise of the court's power to issue mandamus. Id at
594. Judge Hastie, concurring, understood the majority opinion to allow mandamus if the
judge arbitrarily disregards his plain duty to disqualify himself. Id. at 595. In a later case,
the Third Circuit interpreted Green to bar mandamus in § 144 cases, but distinguished Green
and held that the special circumstances of the case before it warranted immediate review of
the district judge's decision not to step down. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 810, 814
(3d Cir. 1965). The court observed that it would not be able to review the interlocutory
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The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the availability of
mandamus for review of judicial disqualification decisions and has
given contradictory signals regarding such use of mandamus. In Ex
parte American Steel Barrel Co.,6 9 the Court exercised its discretion to
deny a writ of mandamus after a trial judge had granted a party's mo-
tion for disqualification due to bias and the senior circuit judge had
appointed a new judge.70 The Court stated that it would grant manda-
mus only "when it is clear and indisputable that there is no other legal
remedy," and noted that review was possible "in due course of law,"
apparently on appeal from the final judgment. 7' The Court noted that
the senior circuit judge had exercised legitimate discretion in ap-
pointing the new judge. 72 In dicta the Court stated that if the trial
judge had refused to disqualify himself, "his action might have been
excepted to and assigned as error when the case finally came under the
reviewing power of an appellate tribunal."73
Eight years later, in Berger v. United States,74 the Court considered
the opposite circumstance. In Berger the trial judge had refused to dis-
order denying disqualification upon appeal from a final judgment because the case was
likely to be transferred to another circuit. Furthermore, the motion for disqualification arose
because the Third Circuit had ordered the district judge to file an answer to an earlier writ
petition requesting the court to overturn the judge's decision to transfer the case, id. at 809,
and the judge had designated an attorney for the defendant to represent him. Id. Because
the alleged grounds for disqualification arose from its earlier order, the Third Circuit said it
had "a duty to correct," and it did so in the exercise of its supervisory authority and in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, "both well recognized grounds for mandamus." Id at 810 (cita-
tions omitted). Nonetheless, the court emphasized that its decision "in no way enlarged the
right of review," and it expressly refused to determine whether the judge's conduct came
within § 455. Id. at 814. It is likely that the Third Circuit will continue to refuse, as it did in
Green, to issue writs of mandamus if the only issue presented in the writ petition is the
judge's failure to disqualify himself.
It is unclear whether mandamus is unavailable in the Sixth Circuit because it is never
warranted or because the facts presented simply have not justified the writ. In Albert v.
United States Dist. Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961), the
Sixth Circuit noted that mandamus has been held to be unavailable in judicial disqualifica-
tion cases, citing precedents from the Third and Seventh Circuits, but nevertheless examined
the facts concerning personal bias and concluded that there was insufficient evidence of bias.
In City of Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 834
(1980), the court reiterated the view that mandamus is not available and that review of
judicial disqualification denials should await final judgment. The court also noted, how-
ever, that the asserted basis for disqualification-judicial conduct during the pending case-
was not a proper basis for disqualification under the statutes. Id at 577-78.
69. 230 U.S. 35 (1913).
70. Id. at 40-42.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. Id at 45.
74. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
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qualify himself when faced with an affidavit alleging bias. After trial
the final decision was appealed to the court of appeals, which certified
questions to the Supreme Court. The Court, in the course of evaluating
whether disqualification was warranted under the statutory provisions,
stated,
[tlo commit to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives
chance for the evil against which the section is directed. The remedy
by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the trial and, if prejudice exist,
it has worked its evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is
precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and nothing can
be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind
in which there is a personal ingredient.75
Although the Court indicated that appeal after final judgment is inade-
quate, the Berger Court was primarily concerned with devising a mech-
anism for achieving actual and apparent judicial impartiality by
removing from the challenged judge the power to decide whether facts
alleged in the affidavit are true.76 Thus Berger, like American Steel
Barrel, simply offers dicta concerning the availability of mandamus to
review denials of disqualification motions.
Application of the Requirements for Mandamus to the Disqualification
Models
The appropriateness of the writ of mandamus in the judicial dis-
qualification context can best be evaluated by applying the require-
ments for mandamus to the two models for judicial disqualification.
The fundamental difference between the two models, the degree of dis-
cretion that is required in determining the disqualification issue, is criti-
cal to resolving whether the writ of mandamus is an appropriate review
mechanism.
The Requirements for Mandamus
Review by writ of mandamus77 has traditionally been available
only in extraordinary situations.78 Initially mandamus was available
75. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
76. Id
77. The writ of mandamus is authorized currently by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982),
which provides that "It]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law." This provision also authorizes the writ of prohibition,
which has been sought as an alternative to mandamus in some judicial disqualification
cases. See, e.g., Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
78. Almost every opinion of the Supreme Court in mandamus cases includes some
language to the effect that mandamus and prohibition, "[als extraordinary remedies,. . . are
reserved for really extraordinary cases." ExparteFahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947). See, e.g.,
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only when an appeal of a final judgment would not provide effective
relief;7 9 however, this requirement has been substantially weakened in
recent years.80 Nonetheless, mandamus is not generally available as a
means of interlocutory review or if an appeal from the final judgment
can be taken.8' Despite the statutory requirement that the writ of man-
damus may issue only in aid of the appellate court's jurisdiction, 82 this
requirement can be satisfied even before a party has perfected his ap-
peal if issuance of the writ is necessary to preserve the appellate court's
ability to afford complete relief to the prevailing party. 3
A second traditional requirement for mandamus is that the writ
will issue only to confine a judge to his jurisdictional powers or to com-
pel him to exercise his judicial authority.8 4 Mandamus has not been
available when a judge has simply erred, but has not abused his judi-
cial power.8 5 For example, mandamus has been available to order a
judge to dismiss a case in which he had asserted jurisdiction contrary to
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1976); LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957).
79. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Exparte Fahey, 332
U.S. 258, 260 (1947); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Exparte Repub-
lic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). See generaly Note, The Writ of Mandamus- A Possible
Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLuM. L. Rav. 1102, 1108 (1950).
80. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1957) ("Since the Court of
Appeals could at some stage of the antitrust proceeding entertain appeals in these cases, it
has power in proper circumstances, as here, to issue writs of mandamus reaching them.").
But see Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978) (reatfirming limitations on an
appellate court's power to issue a writ of mandamus); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-
97 (1967) (policy against piecemeal appeals takes on greater weight in a criminal prosecu-
tion). See generally Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86
HARv. L. REv. 595, 603-05 (1973).
81. LaBuy, 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957). Indeed, cases after LaBuy reemphasize the tradi-
tional view that mandamus must be carefully limited to ensure that it does not become a
substitute for appeal. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-97, 97 n.5 (1967)
(mandamus was denied with respect to a trial judge's order that the government comply
with a bill of particulars despite the possibility that there was no other mechanism for review
of the order). See also Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 505-07 (1979) (mandamus denied
where direct appeal of ruling on speech or debate clause available); Kerr v. United States
Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,403 (1976) (mandamus denied where adequate alternatives existed
for review of discovery order).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
83. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943). See Note, supra note 80,
at 595 n.1, 603 n. 42.
84. Roche, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). See also Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976).
85. Roche, 319 U.S. 21, 27 (1943). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6




statute, 86 to require a judge to hear a case,87 and to direct a judge to
perform a ministerial duty.8 8 In contrast, mandamus was not available
to direct a judge to reinstate pleas in abatement to an indictment when
the judge acted within his jurisdictional powers in striking the pleas,
regardless of whether the order was erroneous. 89
The Supreme Court has indicated that mandamus is appropriate
only to correct clear abuses of discretion.90 LaBuy v. Howes Leather
Co.,9t however, illustrates the difficulty of deciding whether a case in-
volves a clear abuse of discretion or simply the improper exercise of
discretion not reviewable by mandamus. In LaBuy the Court held that
the trial judge's reference of a complex antitrust case to a master under
Rule 53(b) was reviewable by mandamus. 92 The Court characterized
the trial judge's reference order as an abdication of his judicial func-
tions that nullified the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.93
The four dissenting Justices, however, noted that Rule 53(b) "vested
Judge LaBuy with the discretionary power to make a reference if he
found, as he did, that 'some exceptional condition' required the refer-
ence."'94 The dissenters argued that, at most, Judge LaBuy's ruling
amounted to mere error, reviewable only on appeal.95 Elsewhere the
Court has tried to clarify the rule that mere error should not be trans-
formed into abuse of discretion in order to invoke mandamus. 9
6
86. Exparte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924) (involving § 154 of the Judicial
Code).
87. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976); McClellan
v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910). In Thermtron mandamus was issued to require a trial
judge to entertain an action that he had remanded to state court on a ground not authorized
in the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Mandamus was necessary "to prevent nullification
of the removal statutes by remand orders resting on grounds having no warrant in the law."
423 U.S. at 353. In these cases the grant of the writ of mandamus enabled the appellate
court to protect its appellate jurisdiction. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662
(1978).
88. Ex parie United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) (petition for a writ of mandamus
granted requiring a judge to set aside an order denying an application for a bench warrant).
89. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 27 (1943).
90. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1967).
91. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
92. ld. at 256.
93. Id at 256-57. Apparently the trial judge had frequently referred cases to masters
because of congestion of the court.
94. Id at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter, Burton & Harlan, JJ.).
95. Id. The dissenters applied the traditional requirements for mandamus-that the
lower court had exceeded or refused to exercise its jurisdiction or that the writ was necessary
to preserve effective appellate review of the issue-and found that the requirements had not
been satisfied. Id at 260-62.
96. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n.6 (1967) ("Courts ... must be
careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by labels such as 'abuse of discretion' and
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While LaBuy appears to broaden the scope of the clear abuse of
discretion standard, the opinion evidences the Court's great concern for
preserving the appellate court's supervisory control of the trial court to
ensure proper judicial administration.97 The latter concern may consti-
tute a new rationale for mandamus separate from traditional doc-
trine.98 The Court invoked both rationales for mandamus in
Schlagenhaufv. Holder,99 holding that a judge's order of a physical ex-
amination of a defendant was reviewable through mandamus. The
Court noted the allegations that the order was beyond the power of the
trial judge, and the Court addressed issues of a supervisory nature in-
volving construction of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 100
The difficulty of distinguishing between an abuse of discretion and
the exercise of discretion is demonstrated by the divergent opinions in
the more recent case of Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. 10  The plu-
rality viewed the judge's decision to defer federal proceedings pending
concurrent state litigation as an exercise of discretion not amenable to
review through mandamus,10 2 although it acknowledged that a court of
appeals may issue the writ to correct "unauthorized action of the dis-
trict court obstructing the appeal" if a judge "obstinately refuses to ad-
judicate a matter properly before [him]". 03 Four dissenting Justices,
however, concluded that mandamus should issue because the judge
clearly abused his discretion in failing to exercise jurisdiction. 04
Courts are reluctant to issue writs of mandamus for several rea-
sons. First, frequent reliance on mandamus would substantially inter-
fere with the final judgment rule as well as with strong congressional
and judicial policies against piecemeal litigation. 0 5 The Court has
'want of power' into interlocutory review of nonappealable orders on the mere ground that
they may be erroneous.").
97. LaBuy, 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957).
98. See generally Note, supra note 80. That Note suggests supervisory mandamus is
proper where "the order attacked represents one instance of a significant erroneous practice
the appellate court finds is likely to recur." Id. at 610 (footnote omitted).
99. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
100. Id. at 110-12 (1964). Schlagenhauf and LaBuy have also been interpreted as au-
thorizing "advisory mandamus," le., the use of mandamus "to settle 'novel and important'
questions of law." Note, supra note 80, at 611-13.
101. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
102. Id at 665-66. Justice Blackmun, while concurring only in the judgment, probably
agreed with this rationale because his separate opinion dealt only with a different issue in
the case.
103. Id at 666-67.
104. Id. at 676-77.
105. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
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stated that mandamus is not available simply because adherence to the
final judgment rule would cause inconvenience, cost, or other hardship
to the litigants. 0 6 The congressional requirement of appellate review
only upon final judgment would be thwarted if mandamus became an
avenue for piecemeal appeals, and final judgment in the case could be
delayed.10 7 Thus, even if the issue is whether the trial judge properly
exercised his discretion in awarding a new trial, mandamus is ordina-
rily unavailable because review can be obtained by direct appeal after a
final judgment has been entered upon completion of the new trial.'08
Courts have also been concerned that the mandamus petition turns
the judge into a litigant. 0 9 The judge must either hire counsel or allow
counsel of a party to represent him, thus raising questions of potential
bias in subsequent rulings in the case." 0 Perhaps even more important,
involving the judge as a litigant reduces respect for the judiciary and
the judicial system.
Finally, the Court has stressed that even when the basic tests for
mandamus are satisfied, the decision to grant the writ is ultimately
within the discretion of the appellate court."' The Court has fre-
quently indicated that, although the appellate court might have the
power to grant the writ in a certain category of cases, it may nonethe-
less deny the writ as inappropriate based on the specific facts in such a
case. 12 Moreover, the Court requires the petitioner to show that his
"right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable,' ""13 a heavy
burden of proof.
106. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
107. Roche, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943); Cobbledick, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
108. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980).
109. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1953); Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947)).
110. Kerr, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1965).
The Rafpp court established a prospective rule in mandamus cases making the judge a party
in name only and leaving litigation of the transfer of venue to the real parties in interest.
Rapp, 350 F.2d at 812-13. This rule may not be fully effective when mandamus is sought for
judicial disqualification, because neither party may want to support the judge. If one party
does support the judge, this association may create additional grounds for allegations of
bias. For example, in In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 368
U.S. 927 (1961), the intervenor was permitted to answer the petition in place of the trial
judge. Id at 384. The petitioner argued unsuccessfully that the intervenor chose to support
the trial judge because it believed that the judge was prejudiced in its favor. Id at 384 n.4.
111. See, e.g., Kerr, 426 U.S. 394,403 (1976); Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. 104, 111 n.8 (1964);
Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956).
112. See, e.g., Roche, 319 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1943).
113. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (quoting United
States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)). See also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S.
655, 662 (1978).
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The Supreme Court's decisions on the availability of mandamus
thus suggest several questions that must be addressed before the writ
will issue. First, how does the availability of mandamus interact with
the final judgment rule in a given case? Does mandamus offer a neces-
sary relief valve for the pressures of the final judgment rule, or would
the issuance of the writ unduly permit piecemeal appeals and the asso-
ciated problems Congress sought to avoid? Second, has the lower court
simply exercised its discretion, in which case mandamus is not avail-
able to correct error; or has the lower court abused its discretion or
failed to exercise its authority, thus making mandamus appropriate?
These issues will now be discussed in the context of mandamus review
of a trial judge's decision not to disqualify himself.
Propriety of Mandamus Review of Judicial Disqualification Orders
The models developed above provide a useful framework for eval-
uating the propriety of using the writ of mandamus to review judicial
disqualification decisions. In the following discussion it will be argued
that the availability of mandamus should depend on whether judicial
disqualification is premised on objective tests of proscribed relation-
ships, as in the Model I cases, or on subjective criteria of bias, as in the
Model II cases. Thus, evaluation of the propriety of review by manda-
mus requires that the traditional mandamus criteria be analyzed ac-
cording to the type of disqualification decision involved.
The Current A vailability of Mandamus
The courts have typically treated judicial disqualification orders as
homogenous, and have failed to distinguish the cases involving objec-
tive criteria from those involving subjective criteria. 114 Although most
circuits have held that mandamus is available in appropriate cases to
review judicial disqualification decisions, courts frequently have denied
the writ on discretionary grounds based on the factual circumstances of
the case.' 15
114. A rare exception is the Seventh Circuit, which has held that mandamus is not avail-
able to review judicial disqualification under the bias provision of 28 U.S.C. § 144, see, e.g.,
Action Realty Co. v. Will, 427 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1970); Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211 (7th
Cir. 1954), but has granted mandamus in a case involving proscribed relationships under
§ 455, SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1977). The court believed that
"the specificity and legislative intent of section 455 are sufficiently different from section 144
as to warrant a departure from our previous position." Id. at 117. The court found that the
failure of the trial judge to disqualify himself when his brother's law firm represented a
party was a violation of §§ 455(a) and (b)(5)(iii), and an abuse of discretion warranting
issuance of the writ of mandamus. Id. at 117-18.
115. See supra notes 66-68 & accompanying text.
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The courts of appeals have mentioned a variety of grounds for the
availability of mandamus in the judicial disqualification context. Some
courts have invoked the traditional criteria making mandamus avail-
able to aid appellate jurisdiction,'" 6 or to aid the supervisory power of
the appellate courts."17 Others have stressed the special need for man-
damus in the disqualification context to preserve a right to a fair and
impartial hearing," 8 and one court noted that a claim of judicial bias
strikes at the heart of the judicial process." 9
Courts have noted that the postponement of appellate review of
disqualification orders has a particularly negative effect on the admin-
istration of justice.' 20 Moreover, the effect of bias charges upon the
judge may pervade the trial and make appeal after final judgment inef-
fective.' 21 In virtually all appellate opinions these factors have been
mentioned without special regard for the type of the disqualification at
issue.
Model I Cases
In Model I cases the trial judge must disqualify himself if he
stands in a statutorily forbidden relationship to a party; he cannot exer-
cise discretion.' 22 If a judge fails to disqualify himself in such circum-
stances, he has violated the express command of the statute and
exceeded his jurisdiction. This abuse of discretion is precisely the kind
of situation in which the courts traditionally have granted
mandamus.123
Although Model I cases clearly satisfy the abuse of discretion test
116. See, e.g., Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1934)
(writ denied). Cf. Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 1951)
(writ of prohibition issued to prevent the trial judge from taking any further action in the
case).
117. See, e.g., In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), aft'd for
absence ofquorum sub non. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983) (writ
denied); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976) (vacated and re-
manded with instructions); Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976)
(recusal of judge ordered).
118. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
119. In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980).
120. See Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Union Leader
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
121. See, e.g., Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1965); Connelly v. United
States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951); In re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 18-33.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 84-104.
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for mandamus, the interaction of mandamus with the principles of the
final judgment rule must be examined. The final judgment rule em-
bodies the concern of Congress and the courts that immediate appeal of
every issue at trial would delay ultimate resolution of litigation, dimin-
ish the power and prestige of the trial bench, overburden the appellate
bench, and ultimately diminish respect for the judicial system.124 Be-
cause mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be used only when ap-
pellate review is inadequate, 125 the issue is whether the detriment from
delayed review of a judicial disqualification decision in a Model I case
outweighs the concerns embodied in the final judgment rule and war-
rants immediate review by mandamus.
Immediate review is warranted in Model I cases. Congress en-
acted a firm rule of disqualification on the belief that the proscribed
relationships were likely to result in bias, or at least the appearance of
partiality.126 Delayed review of an order denying disqualification of a
judge with a proscribed relationship would leave that judge in a posi-
tion to issue numerous orders fundamentally shaping the case. Any
bias resulting from the proscribed relationship could influence the
judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, in making the rulings. If
the appellate court ultimately disqualifies the judge after final judg-
ment and orders a new trial, every ruling involving any exercise of dis-
cretion by the disqualified judge would have to be reconsidered.127
This problem is aggravated when the rulings are difficult, if not impos-
sible, to undo. For example, rulings permitting discovery, requiring
124. See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351
(1961).
125. See supra notes 78-80 & accompanying text.
126. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6355.
127. The courts have rarely addressed the question of what action the second trial judge
should take upon remand after reversal of final judgment due to the initial judge's refusal to
disqualify himself. Some opinions simply remand the case for a new trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130, 1133 (6th Cir. 1969) (remand for new trial as the judge
should have disqualified himself under § 455(b) because he was U.S. attorney when com-
plaint filed, although court of appeals believed that the first trial was actually "fair"). Cf. In
reRodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976) (pretrial rulings issued by judge who was removed
by mandamus need not be reviewed and should remain law of the case, since no bias was
alleged). One case suggests that the new judge could review the totality of the record and
decide whether to endorse the prior rulings. Ransom v. S & S Food Center, Inc., 700 F.2d
670, 673 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (new judge adopted first judge's rulings after first judge disqualified
himself because his father's partner had represented a party). Another case holds that the
entire proceedings and disposition below are a "nullity." Mixon v. United States, 620 F.2d
486 (5th Cir. 1980) (magistrate had been defendant's prosecutor in earlier related proceed-
ing). In none of these cases did the reviewing court analyze in any detail the extent to which
the basis for disqualification may have affected prior orders of the judge.
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disclosure, or involving temporary injunctive relief may effectively
never be reversible.
Even assuming that a second trial would be untainted by the bias
of the disqualified judge in the initial trial, other costs ensue from pro-
ceeding with the initial trial before review of the disqualification mo-
tion. One especially serious cost is the erosion of public confidence in
the effective administration of justice that may result if a judge in-
volved in a proscribed relationship conducts the case. The court system
will appear ineffectual to the public and to the adversely affected liti-
gant if it is unable to halt proceedings involving Model I bias. A public
perception of the appearance of bias may not be altered by a new trial
after final judgment.
Moreover, review of the disqualification decision in Model I cases
by mandamus can be accomplished easily and efficiently. A finding of
Model I bias involves an objective determination that a proscribed re-
lationship exists, or that a specific relationship is prohibited by stat-
ute.128 Such determinations can be reviewed expeditiously.' 29 Thus,
immediate review of Model I cases by mandamus promotes efficiency,
while delaying review until final judgment entails additional costs.
Furthermore, mandamus review would not substantially conflict
with the policies underlying the final judgment rule. 30 Model I cases
are unlikely to occur so frequently as to overburden the appellate
bench, given the limited number and scope of proscribed relationships
and the inherent reluctance of counsel to challenge the judge. When
disqualification is raised by a party, the issues must first be addressed
by the trial judge; an immediate appellate court review will not weaken
the already challenged prestige of the trial court, and in fact is likely to
increase respect for the judicial system.
In summary, Model I cases satisfy the major requirements for issu-
ance of the extraordinary writ. These cases typically concern whether a
judge has exceeded his jurisdictional powers and are often not effec-
tively reviewable upon appeal. Furthermore, immediate review by writ
of mandamus can be accomplished efficiently. Thus, mandamus
should be available to afford immediate review in Model I cases. Al-
though the decision to grant a writ of mandamus rests within the dis-
cretion of the appellate court,13 ' Model I cases are especially amenable
128. See supra notes 41-44 & accompanying text.
129. All petitions for mandamus are given priority on the appellate docket. FED. R.
APP. P. 21(b).
130. See supra notes 124-25 & accompanying text.
131. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
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to the exercise of that discretion. 132
Model II Cases
Model II cases, involving bias-in-fact or the appearance of bias,
differ fundamentally from Model I cases in the amount of discretion
involved in determining the necessity of disqualification. 33 In Model
II cases a judge must determine whether he is biased concerning a
party, or whether reasonable persons would question his impartial-
ity.134 The exercise of discretion is inherent in this determination. Al-
though the judge is required to disqualify himself when bias or the
appearance of partiality exists, 135 the finding of bias or its appearance is
necessarily based on a subjective evaluation of the facts. 136
In re Union Leader Corp. 137 provides a good example of the sub-
jectivity and exercise of discretion involved in Model II cases. In Union
Leader, one party moved to disqualify the judge on grounds of alleged
bias resulting from editorials published in the party's newspaper that
had criticized the judge. 138 The trial judge refused to disqualify him-
self under section 144, stating that he did not feel any prejudice. 39 The
court of appeals, reviewing the disqualification issue on petition for
writ of mandamus, concluded that the judge's responses did not
demonstrate personal bias or prejudice and denied the writ.140 Both
the trial and appellate courts were required to make inherently subjec-
132. In some instances appellate courts have granted petitions for writs of mandamus in
circumstances encompassed by Model I. See, e.g., In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir.
1976) (mandamus granted because district judge's former law partner, during partnership
with the judge, represented interests involved in the pending litigation, requiring disqualifi-
cation under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)). See also Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (mandamus granted because judge was repre-
sented in another pending case by party's counsel); In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F.
348 (9th Cir. 1917) (possible effect of litigation on stock owned by the district judge consti-
tuted a proscribed interest warranting issuance of writ of mandamus).
133. See supra notes 40-59 & accompanying text.
134. Technically, under § 144 the judge must accept the facts stated in the affidavit of
disqualification and simply determine whether the affidavit is sufficient to warrant disquali-
fication on the grounds of bias. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-36 (1921);
Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 69 (1983). This requirement removes a factual determination from the judge's
consideration, yet leaves him with the obligation to decide whether such facts sufficiently
indicate bias-in-fact. Section 455 does not contain the affidavit procedure of § 144, but re-
quires much of the same analysis. See supra notes 30-39 & accompanying text.
135. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) (1982).
136. See supra notes 49-59 & accompanying text.
137. 292 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
138. Id at 385-86.
139. Id at 383, 386.
140. Id. at 389-91.
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tive evaluations regarding the effect of the editorials on the judge's state
of mind.
The Union Leader facts illustrate that the disqualification determi-
nation in Model II cases14' necessitates an exercise of discretion by the
trial judge that does not satisfy the second essential requirement for
mandamus, to confine a judge to his power or to require him to exercise
his authority. 42 Thus, the typical Model II case should not be re-
viewed on writ of mandamus under traditional theory.143 Whether the
theory of mandamus should be adjusted to permit mandamus review
for Model II cases will now be examined.
A fundamental concern of our judicial system is to provide impar-
tial justice both in appearance and in fact.144 Permitting a judge who is
or appears to be biased to try a case, and allowing review only after
final judgment, is an enormous encroachment on this fundamental
value. Judge Hastie expressed these concerns in his concurring opinion
in Green v. Murphy:145
The very special, challenging and often sensational charge of partial-
ity in the administration of justice which is initiated by a formal affi-
davit of prejudice against a judge should receive final adjudication at
first opportunity, if only in the interest of public confidence in the
courts. Moreover, a trial is not likely to proceed in a very satisfactory
way if an unsettled claim of judicial bias is an ever present source of
tension and irritation. Only a final ruling on the matter by a disinter-
ested higher court before trial can dispel this unwholesome
aura. . . . [P]ostponement of decision hurts the administration of
141. Some Model II cases might be reviewable by mandamus even under the traditional
theory. For example, if a judge had stated publicly that he detested a party and would rule
against the party on every matter regardless of the merits, his failure to disqualify himself
would be a clear abuse of discretion, not mere error.
142. This conclusion applies to both subcategories of Model II described supra notes 49-
51 & accompanying text. In the Union Leader case, an example of type A, the judge was
charged with actual bias, and the decision required substantial judicial discretion. Type B,
the appearance of bias category, is judged according to a more objective standard. To the
extent that they incorporate a reasonableness test, however, even type B cases require an
exercise of discretion not required in Model I situations.
143. Nonetheless, several courts of appeals have granted writs of mandamus and re-
quired disqualification of judges in Model II cases, ostensibly under traditional standards
for mandamus. See, e.g., United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 951 (1976) (mandamus granted to require disqualification pursuant to § 455(a) due to
an apparent relationship between the attorney and the judge); Conmelly v. United States
Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951) (mandamus granted to require disqualification
pursuant to § 144 on basis of judge's comments about Communists).
144. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921);
Note, Disqualofcation of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REv. 736,
746-47 (1973); Comment, Disqualfcation for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28
U.S.C. § 455, 71 MICH. L. Rnv. 538, 561-64 (1973).
145. 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
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justice, even though the [appellate] court reserves the right to pass
upon the matter after trial. Such considerations far outweigh the ob-jections to piecemeal appeals which ordinarily militate against decid-
ing on mandamus an issue which can be reviewed after trial.' 46
As in Model 1, 147 review on appeal from final judgment is ineffec-
tive in Model II cases, thus satisfying the first requirement for manda-
mus. Indeed, because allegations of bias-in-fact or the appearance of
bias attack the integrity of the judicial process, 148 review after final
judgment is particularly ineffective for Model 11.149 Under these cir-
cumstances, the second requirement of confining a judge to his jurisdic-
tion arguably should no longer be essential to obtain mandamus review
in Model II cases.
Thus, one approach is to link the propriety of mandamus to the
inadequacy of delayed appellate review when the integrity of the judi-
146. Id. at 595.
147. See supra note 127 & accompanying text for a discussion of the ineffectiveness of
remedy by appeal in Model I cases.
148. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921) ("The remedy by appeal is
inadequate. It comes after trial and, if prejudice exists, it has worked its evil and a judgment
of it in a reviewing court is precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and nothing
can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in which there is a
personal ingredient."); In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting In re
Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (lst Cir. 1961)) ("the claim of bias cannot be labelled
as frivolous and deferred until final appeal. '[Plublic confidence in the courts [requires] that
such a question be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity.' "). But see Green v.
Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1958) (stating that review of judicial bias charge upon
appeal of criminal conviction is an adequate remedy).
149. In Model II cases, in which bias or the appearance of bias is involved, it may be
especially difficult to remedy, on appeal of final judgment, the damage caused by the biased
rulings at the pretrial and trial stages. See In reIBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 934 (2d Cir. 1980)
(implying that if first judge is disqualified for bias, new judge will have to review record and
"purge those parts revealing extrajudicial bias"). Nonetheless, at least one Model II case
was reversed on the ground ofjudicial bias and remanded for a new trial. United States v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1980). Cf Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1980) (on
review of final judgment the court of appeals held that the district judge should have dis-
qualified himself under § 455(a), and it remanded for further proceedings); Fredonia Broad-
casting Corp. v. RCA, 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978) (on review of
final judgment in the second trial, the court reversed and remanded for a third trial because
the initial judge should have been disqualified under § 455 (a)).
Because § 144 required that the challenged trial judge proceed no further, some older
cases when granting mandamus required that the new judge hear all further proceedings.
See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 915 (1963); Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951). In
these cases the courts failed to appreciate that the bias of the judge may have influenced his
earlier rulings and thus harmed the affected party. Reexamination of contested rulings
would not be inconsistent with the language of § 144. Moreover, § 455 does not contain
similar language, but rather requires a judge to disqualify himself. The language of § 455




cial process is implicated. Such an approach, which obviates the prob-
lem posed by the discretionary aspect of a Model II disqualification
decision, has been implied by at least one court. In In re IBM Corp. 150
the Second Circuit held that it had the power to review by mandamus a
trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal
bias. The court stated:
The question here is not whether the trial judge had abused his dis-
cretion because of a personal, extrajudicial bias which precludes dis-
passionate judgment . . . . A claim of personal bias and prejudice
strikes at the integrity of the judicial process, and it would be intoler-
able to hold that the disclaimer of prejudice by the very jurist who is
accused of harboring it should itself terminate the inquiry until an
ultimate appeal on the merits. 151
Under this proposed reformulation of mandamus criteria, manda-
mus would be appropriate in Model II cases to review judicial denials
of disqualification on grounds of bias or appearance of bias, in order to
ensure impartiality in the judicial system and to remedy the ineffective-
ness of review from final judgment. This reasoning applies even if the
trial judge's decision did not amount to an abuse of power, but was
simply an erroneous exercise of discretion. Because the trial judge in
ruling on a disqualification motion decides whether he himself is or
appears to be biased, swift review is essential to ensure impartiality. By
narrowly confining the applicability of this reformulation to those trial
court decisions affecting the fundamental concern of providing impar-
tial justice, the reformulation would not substantially weaken the tradi-
tional standards for mandamus outlined above. 152 The importance of
impartiality to the success of the judicial system and the crucial super-
visory aspects involved in review of judicial disqualification orders153
150. 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 926-27. Although the court held that it had the power to issue the writ of
mandamus, it found that the party seeking disqualification had not shown a clear and indis-
putable right to relief in the absence of proof that the judge was actually prejudiced against
the party, or that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Id. at 926-29. Cf.
Legal Aid Soe'y v. Herlands, 399 F.2d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922
(1969) ("Refusal of recusation goes to the constitution of the tribunal which is to conduct the
trial, an issue which. . . comes exceedingly close to jurisdiction and thus is within the tradi-
tional concept of mandamus.").
152. See supra notes 77-113 & accompanying text.
153. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), affdfor absence of
quorum sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983) (invoking su-
pervisory mandamus authority when the resolution of the disqualification issue would aid
the efficient and orderly administration of trial courts). The establishment, enunciation, and
enforcement of criteria for judicial disqualification that conform to statutory standards can
form a basis for supervisory and advisory mandamus review that is consistent with Supreme
Court doctrine established in LaBuy and Schlagenhauf, discussed supra notes 97-100 & ac-
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justify confining the application of this reformulation of mandamus cri-
teria to the review of judicial disqualification cases.
Alternatives to Mandamus
The difficulties in obtaining mandamus review of Model II cases
and the courts' general reluctance to invoke mandamus warrant exami-
nation of other methods for obtaining immediate review of judicial dis-
qualification decisions. An alternative to review by mandamus is a
statutory or judicial exception to the final judgment rule allowing inter-
locutory appeal. Interlocutory appeal affords immediate review of a
significant issue affecting the public's and the litigants' perceptions of
the impartiality of the judicial system without requiring alteration of
traditional mandamus criteria.
The avenue of interlocutory appeal is even more attractive because
of doubt regarding the appropriate standard of review in mandamus
proceedings. Courts traditionally have been reluctant to issue the writ
of mandamus even when they believed they had the power to do so,
and have imposed on the litigant the burden of demonstrating a clear
and indisputable right to the writ. 5 4 This clear and indisputable right
standard for mandamus appears to be stricter than the abuse of discre-
tion standard courts have applied in reviewing disqualification denials
on appeal. 55 If the mandamus standard of review is stricter, then a
party who fails to obtain a writ of mandamus arguably can still raise
the disqualification issue on appeal from final judgment where a less
companying text. In some Model II cases the denial of disqualification may involve a signif-
icant error, presenting either novel questions of law or questions likely to recur. For
example, supervisory mandamus is appropriate if a judge repeatedly makes comments dem-
onstrating bias against a party, yet fails to grant the disqualification motion. See United
States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960). Advisory
mandamus is appropriate if, for example, the judge denies disqualification because he dis-
agrees that his involvement in a church whose members have strong views on the subject
matter of litigation constitutes actual or apparent bias, thus presenting a novel question of
law for the appeals court. Cf. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981), 478 F.
Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979) (review of disqualification denial never actually sought because of
other developments).
154. See, e.g., In reUnited States, 666 F.2d 690, 695-96 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
155. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1983); Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 514 (10th
Cir. 1979); Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1979); S.J. Groves & Sons Co.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 627, 581 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1978); Mayberry
v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d Cir. 1977). The First Circuit applies the same abuse of
discretion test in mandamus cases. United States v. Bonilla, 626 F.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1st Cir.
1980).
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strict burden of proof prevails, 56 thus creating the potential for dupli-
cative review. Interlocutory appeal may be a more desirable mecha-
nism than mandamus because review on interlocutory appeal involves
application of traditional tests for review on appeal,15 7 thus avoiding
the possibility of a second consideration of the disqualification issue
under a different standard of proof. The availability of interlocutory
appeal under the collateral order doctrine and section 1292(b) certifica-
tion will be considered in the following two sections.
Review Under the Collateral Order Doctrine
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an appeal can be taken only from a "final
decision."' 58 A decision is final if it "ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the [district] court to do but execute the judg-
156. Several courts of appeals have reconsidered a disqualification issue on appeal from
a final judgment after a petition for writ of mandamus had been denied. See Phillips v.
Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); United
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (denying
disqualification on appeal of final judgment in Mitchell v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955 (1974) (denying writ of mandamus)). But see Age of Majority
Educ. Corp. v. Preller, 512 F.2d 1241, 1245 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that the denial of manda-
mus was "on the merits" and the disqualification issue would not be reconsidered). See
generally Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States Courts ofAyppeals: A Complex
and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 37, 78-85 (1982) (suggesting
that the standard of review should be the same in mandamus proceedings as on appeal from
final judgment).
157. Indeed, even the normal standard for appellate review, abuse of discretion, is ar-
guably too strict when the issue concerns judicial impartiality. If the trial judge has ruled on
the question of his own partiality, perhaps the reviewing court should decide the issue de
novo rather than defer to the trial judge. This approach is particularly appropriate if the
issue is legal rather than factual, so that the demeanor and credibility of witnesses are irrele-
vant. See supra note 127. Cf. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir.
1982), affldfor absence of quorum sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S.
1191 (1983) (in a supervisory mandamus case the appeals court may issue a writ if it con-
cludes that district court erred, even if it cannot characterize the trial court's action as
"clearly erroneous"). Moreover, strict standards for review are anomalous given the easily
satisfied substantive requirements for disqualification in amended 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982).
See supra notes 18-39 & accompanying text.
The only comment on appellate review in the House Report is opaque. The Report
stated that the provision of § 455(a) regarding the appearance of bias standard "is not
designed to alter the standard of appellate review on disqualification issues. The issue of
disqualification is a sensitive question of assessing all the facts and circumtances [sic] in
order to determine whether the failure to disqualify was an abuse of sound judicial discre-
tion." HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6355. This apparent endorsement of the abuse of discretion standard refers simply to the
bias provisions, not to the proscribed relationship sections.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
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ment."'159 The requirement of finality reflects the concern that piece-
meal appeals will delay resolution of the litigation and severely weaken
judicial administration. 60 The collateral order doctrine constitutes a
narrow exception under which a litigant may obtain immediate appeal
from an interlocutory order.' 6' This section will address the propriety
of the collateral order doctrine as a means to review judicial disqualifi-
cation cases. The first part will review the requirements for invocation
of the collateral order doctrine and discuss whether they are satisfied in
Model I and Model II situations. The second part will examine the
traditional policy considerations militating against interlocutory appeal
that have led the courts to limit strictly the application of the doctrine.
Requirements
The collateral order doctrine was developed over thirty years ago
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.'62 The Supreme Court de-
termined that an interlocutory order is immediately appealable if it
falls "in that small class which finally determine[s] claims of right sepa-
rable from; and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important
to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated." 163 In Cohen the district court had held that a state law requiring
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits to post security did not apply
to actions brought in federal court.' 64 In holding that the district
court's order was immediately appealable, the Court found that the or-
der was "a final disposition of a claimed right which [was] not an ingre-
dient of the cause of action' 65 and that the defendant's right to
159. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (quoted in Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)).
160. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940), in which Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous Court noted:
Since the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not
a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very beginning has, by forbid-
ding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single
controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby is
avoided the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harass-
ment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which
a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective,
judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be ar-
rested by permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified cause.
See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
161. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
162. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
163. Id. at 546.
164. Id. at 544-47.
165. Id. at 546-47.
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security might be irretrievably lost if he were forced to await review of
the issue on appeal from the final judgment. 66 In addition, the Court
stressed that the defendant's appeal presented a "serious and unsettled
question"'' 67 and cautioned that it might reach a different conclusion on
the issue of appealability if the defendant's right to security were clear
and if the order "involved only an exercise of discretion as to the
amount of security." 68
The first two Cohen requirements, that the district court orderfi-
nally determine an issue collateral to the merits of the action, do not
pose significant difficulty in judicial disqualification cases. A trial
judge's decision not to disqualify himself is as final as the order deny-
ing imposition of security obligations in Cohen. In both situations, de-
spite a technical possibility of reopening the issue at the trial court
level, the litigation proceeds with respect to other issues on the assump-
tion that the judge's decision is final.169 Moreover, whether based on
allegations of proscribed relationships or bias, the determination of the
disqualification issue is separable from the merits of the case. Disquali-
fication revolves around the judge's relationships to the parties and his
state of mind, and is to be resolved without consideration of his judicial
rulings. 170
The inadequacy of remedy by appeal and the unsettled question
requirements, however, may be obstacles to obtaining interlocutory re-
view under the collateral order doctrine. In the recent case of Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,171 the Court focused on the inadequacy of
166. Id at 546. The Supreme Court more recently formulated the Cohen three-part test
in these terms: "IT]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978) (quoted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982)).
In Coopers & Lybrand the Court unanimously held that the collateral order doctrine
could not be used to obtain immediate review of a trial judge's decision concerning certifica-
tion of a class action because the three key elements of the doctrine were absent. First, the
district judge could revise his order during the course of the case, so the decision was not
truly final. Second, the determination of certification was not separable from the factual and
legal issues of the case. Third, effective review on appeal after final judgment was available.
437 U.S. at 469.
167. Cohen, 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
168. Id
169. As the Court stated in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375
(1981), a case involving disqualification of counsel, the denial of disqualification is conclu-
sive, "because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue."
Furthermore, with respect to disqualification under § 144, the statute explicitly permits only
one affidavit of prejudice, ie., one challenge. See supra notes 10-11 & accompanying text.
170. See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
171. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
May 1984]
appeal requirement, holding that orders denying counsel disqualifica-
tion did not come within the collateral order doctrine. The majority
stated that the order refusing to disqualify counsel was a conclusive
determination of the issue, 172 and assumed that the issue was separable
from the merits. The Court concluded, however, that the party seeking
disqualification had not shown that immediate appeal was necessary,
and held that the court of appeals' power to vacate the judgment and to
order a new trial upon review of the final judgment was an adequate
remedy.173 Indeed, the Court believed that it would be difficult to re-
view properly the district judge's decision on counsel disqualification
until the end of the litigation, when the impact of the decision on the
underlying litigation could be evaluated. 174
The Firestone Court concluded that any potential harm from de-
laying the appeal until final judgment was not significantly different
from that involved in other interlocutory orders that are not immedi-
ately reviewable. The Court quoted a Second Circuit opinion, which
stated that the harm from delay in the appeal of the counsel disqualifi-
cation decision was no different from delay in the appeal of "orders
requiring discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying
motions for recusal of the trial judge."' 175 Although the Court did not
continue the quotation, the Second Circuit had stated that immediate
appeal from these orders was not available. 176 The analogy drawn by
the Firestone Court and by the Second Circuit is simply dictum; neither
court identified or analyzed the special harm inherent in delay of re-
view of judicial disqualification denials.
Although the Firestone Court decided that the collateral order doc-
trine is unavailable to appeal counsel disqualification denials, 177 the
court did not directly decide whether judicial disqualification decisions
could be immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
172. Id. at 375-76. See supra note 169.
173. Id at 378. See also id at 378-79 n. 13. The concurring Justices disagreed only with
the majority's statement that a denial of disqualification is a conclusive determination. /d.
at 380 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 377.
175. Id at 378 (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980),Jpdg-
ment vacated and appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981)).
176. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980), judgment vacated and
appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
177. The Court did suggest, however, that immediate review through a certified question
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) or through mandamus might be appropriate in some cases.
449 U.S. 368 at 378-79 n.13. Mandamus has been used to obtain review of counsel disquali-
fication denials after Firestone. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d
1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (an important legal issue was presented, and the defendant could suffer
substantial harm if the appeal was delayed until final judgment).
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Critical to the resolution of this issue is the portion of the Firestone
opinion concerning the availability of effective review after a final
judgment. Use of the collateral order doctrine in judicial disqualifica-
tion decision cases will be permitted only if it can be demonstrated that,
unlike counsel disqualification cases, effective review after a final judg-
ment is unavailable.
First, consider a simple Model I case in which the trial judge owns
stock in a party but has refused to disqualify himself. Such a decision
meets the requirements of the collateral order doctrine of a final deci-
sion on an issue separate from the merits of the case. 178 But is it effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal of the final judgment?
Effective review on appeal from a final judgment in judicial dis-
qualification cases will usually be extremely difficult and will be inade-
quate to preserve the fact and appearance of impartiality. As noted
above in connection with mandamus, delay of review poses two crucial
problems. First, if the judge erred in refusing to disqualify himself,
then judicial bias may infect the entire proceeding, not just the trial.
The difficulty of proving how bias affected particular rulings may com-
pel beginning the whole proceeding anew. Moreover, the impact of
certain biased rulings may never be negated. 179 Second, it may be im-
possible to undo the damage to the judicial system caused by the im-
pression of partiality given to the litigants and public.180
Delayed review of judicial disqualification decisions causes
problems that are substantially more severe than those involved in de-
nials of counsel disqualifications. Counsel disqualification cases such
as Firestone involve allegations of counsel conflict of interest that may
affect the counsel's conduct of the case or perhaps the adversary pro-
cess. The impact on the litigants can be assessed and resolved after
final judgment of the case.181 Charges of judicial bias, on the other
hand, raise doubts about the judge's impartiality, which is the core of
the judicial system. Congress has required disqualification in Model I
cases on the ground that bias or the appearance of bias is inherent in
certain types of relationships, and so a broad prophylactic rule is neces-
sary.182 Immediate review of denials of judicial disqualification is nec-
essary to preserve the impartial judicial system that the statute was
intended to ensure. Moreover, since section 455(b) establishes strict,
178. See supra notes 169-70.
179. See supra note 127 & accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 144-49 & accompanying text.
181. Firestone, 449 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1981).
182. See supra note 126 & accompanying text.
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objective guidelines for disqualification, evidencing Congress' view that
judges cannot perform or appear to perform impartially when they are
involved in the proscribed relationships, it would be anomalous to re-
quire the party seeking disqualification to demonstrate that review at
the end of the merits of the case would be inadequate protection.
The judicial disqualification statute does not address the availabil-
ity of interlocutory review. Congress' silence, however, could be inter-
preted not as rejection of immediate appealability but as permission for
the judiciary to identify and acknowledge the need for immediate ap-
peal through the collateral order doctrine or through other means such
as mandamus.
In Model II cases, which involve the subjective determination of
whether a judge is biased or has the appearance of bias, Congress has
given the judiciary more discretion to make these determinations. Be-
cause the decision on disqualification in Model II is ultimately based
on judicial discretion, it is all the more important that appellate review
of this exercise of discretion be prompt so that the impartiality of the
judicial system can be preserved as completely and as quickly as possi-
ble. 18 3 The nature of this discretion to be exercised in Model II dis-
qualification cases, involving core principles of judicial impartiality, is
thus distinguishable from the implication in Cohen that the collateral
order doctrine might not apply to the exercise of discretion in setting an
amount of a security deposit. 184
An additional stumbling block for litigants in Model II cases is the
requirement under the collateral order doctrine that the issue involved
be a "serious and unsettled question." 185 This requirement suggests
that immediate review under this theory should be limited to preceden-
183. Several cases state that a denial of disqualification can be reviewed on final judg-
ment or on appeal of some other interlocutory order that is appealable. See, e.g., In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1983);
United States v. Bonilla, 626 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1980); Collier v. Picard, 237 F.2d 234 (6th
Cir. 1956); Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944). Linking review of a disqualifica-
tion denial to the presence of some other immediately appealable order, however, is an
inadequate safeguard of judicial impartiality. Indeed, if the disqualification denial is not
directly connected to the appealable order, it is doubtful that the statements in the above
cases are correct. See United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1978);
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
952 (1964).
184. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,547 (1948); See also supra
text accompanying notes 166-68.
185. Cohen, 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1948). See also, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
742 (1982).
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tial type cases and should not be used for case-by-case analysis.18 6
Model II decisions by their nature require case-by-case analysis be-
cause they entail the exercise of judgment based on particular facts. In
contrast, Model I cases are more likely to depend on statutory interpre-
tation. Whether a particular type of relationship is covered by a statu-
tory prohibition is an issue likely to satisfy the serious, unsettled
question requirement; once resolved, the issue is unlikely to arise again.
The Cohen Court was understandably concerned that the appeals
courts avoid routine review of every interlocutory order regarding se-
curity, 8 7 and thus the requirement of a serious unsettled question in
that context makes good sense. In the judicial disqualification context,
however, immediate review of questionable disqualification decisions is
essential, regardless of their precedential weight, to preserve the ap-
pearance and reality of impartiality. Thus, although Model II cases
may pose special problems under the traditional Cohen unsettled ques-
tion criterion, they nonetheless merit immediate Cohen-type review.
In sum, except for the potential problems posed by the unsettled
question element, both Model I and Model II cases ordinarily will sat-
isfy the Cohen requirements. The appropriateness of immediate review
under the collateral order doctrine in such situations is further evi-
denced by an examination of the policy considerations underlying the
courts' general reluctance to invoke the doctrine.
Policy Considerations
In Firestone, the Court articulated three traditional concerns in
support of strictly limiting interlocutory appeals. The Court empha-
sized that limits on interlocutory appeals ensure appropriate deference
to the trial judge in his role as initial decisionmaker and protect his
independence. Second, these limits avoid the harassment and expense
of successive appeals. Further, these limits promote efficient judicial
administration. 188
186. See also Cohen, 337 U.S. 541,547 (1948) (collateral order doctrine will not be avail-
able to review every security order case).
187. Id
188. Firestone, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). The Court did not decide whether orders
granting counsel disqualification might be immediately appealable under § 1291. Id at 372
n.8. Several Circuits have held such grant orders to be appealable under the collateral order
doctrine. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1982); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 449
U.S. 368 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf Duncan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981) (distinguishing Firestone on the grounds that in grants of counsel disqualification
there is no need to wait to evaluate final impact, and irreparable harm would result if the
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Although these concerns may support the Firestone Court's deci-
sion to limit use of the collateral order doctrine in counsel disqualifica-
tion cases, they are not appropriate in the judicial disqualification
context. First, ensuring appropriate deference to trial judges should
not be a particularly important goal when the judge's own impartiality
is challenged on the ground of congressionally proscribed relationships
or bias. Indeed, in this circumstance little deference should be shown
to the trial judge's determination. 89 Second, judicial disqualification
motions are much less likely to be filed than counsel disqualification
motions because of the serious ramifications of unsuccessful motions;
the filing of a judicial disqualification motion undoubtedly will antago-
nize a judge, consciously or subconsciously. One result is to deter par-
ties from making questionable disqualification motions. 90 Counsel
disqualification motions do not have this drawback, and indeed are be-
coming increasingly common.' 9 ' Thus, practical concerns about a po-
tential flood of appeals, which may have motivated the Firestone Court,
should not be present in judicial disqualification cases. In addition, the
substantial risks undertaken when a party makes a judicial disqualifica-
tion motion indicate that such motions will be used only when clearly
necessary to protect the right of the movant to an impartial trial, thus
justifying any harassment or expense that results from immediate ap-
peal of such a motion. Finally, the goal of efficient judicial administra-
tion must be balanced against the more fundamental goal of impartial
judicial administration. Only in the extreme cases should impartiality
be sacrificed for efficiency. 192
Because judicial disqualification orders will generally satisfy the
Cohen requirements and immediate review will not frustrate the poli-
cies against interlocutory appeal, the collateral order doctrine should
be available for review of Model I and Model II cases. Although the
few circuit courts to consider the issue have rejected use of the doctrine
in this context, 93 the opinions have assumed that review on final judg-
ment is adequate. This is not the case. Nor is the availability of man-
party is forced to proceed with new counsel). In its recent decision in Flanagan v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984), the court held that a grant of counsel disqualification in a
criminal case was not immediately appealable under § 1291.
189. See supra note 157.
190. See, e.g., Davis & Levin, Disqualifying Judges, LITIGATION, Winter 1981, at 11.
191. See generally, Note, The Appealabiliy of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualifica-
tion of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CmI. L. REv. 450 (1978).
192. Thus, for example, efficiency concerns arguably might prevail when appellate re-
view is sought during a lengthy trial.
193. United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 960-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
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damus in certain extraordinary cases a sufficient reason to deny review
under the collateral order doctrine. The standard of review in manda-
mus proceedings is apparently stricter than that for appeal under the
collateral order doctrine and may, as discussed above, create the poten-
tial for duplicative review of judicial disqualification motions.1 94 In
addition, the stricter mandamus standard 9 5 may place an undue bur-
den on the party seeking the writ in light of the fundamental concerns
raised by a trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself. Indeed, if a case
satisfies the mandamus doctrine's requirement of the ineffectiveness of
appeal from final judgment, it will satisfy the collateral order doctrine's
requirement as well.
Review Through Section 1292(b) Certification
The only other mechanism that has been used to obtain interlocu-
tory review of disqualification decisions is the certified controlling
question of law provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This statute permits a
district judge in a civil action to certify that an "order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."' 196 The
court of appeals then has discretion to permit the appeal if application
is timely filed.197 Thus, the process involves two steps in which both
United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d
794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966).
In In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982), aI'dfor absence of
quorum sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983), the Ninth Circuit
denied review under the collateral order doctrine of a grant of judicial disqualification based
on stock ownership, on the basis that the effect of an erroneous decision to disqualify would
not deprive the litigant of a protected right that could be destroyed absent immediate appeal.
The dissenting judge, however, believed review would be consistent with the policies and
doctrine of the collateral order doctrine in light of the substantial delay in familiarizing a
new trial judge with the case. Id at 1030. See also Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d
478, 480 (7th. Cir. 1981) (continued participation of a particular judge is not a claim of right,
thus appeal under collateral order doctrine and review after entry of final judgment or upon
petition for writ of mandamus are precluded).
194. See supra notes 156-57 & accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 154-57 & accompanying text.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
197. Id. An application must be filed within ten days of the challenged order. The court
of appeals has complete discretion in determining whether to hear the appeal. S. REP. No.
2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, refprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5255, 5257
("whatever the reason the ultimate determination concerning the right of appeal is within
the discretion of the judges of the appropriate circuit court of appeals."). See Note, Interloc-
utoryAppeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607 (1975).
Trial court proceedings will continue pending appeal unless otherwise ordered by the trial or
appellate court. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
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trial and appellate courts must be convinced of the need for prompt
appellate review.198
The determination of what consitutes a "controlling question of
law" that will "materially advance the ultimate termination of the liti-
gation" is crucial to the availability of section 1292(b) review ofjudicial
disqualification orders. Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court
suggest that the appellant must demonstrate "that exceptional circum-
stances justify a departure" from the final judgment rule. 199 Although
the legislative history offers little in the way of interpretation of this
language, the term "controlling question of law" appears to require
that there be a significant legal question that will have major impact on
the case, either by shortening the time for litigation or by substantially
altering the nature of the litigation.200 One court has suggested that
198. The importance of the dual determination of the need for immediate review has
been stressed by the courts, see, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75
(1978), the Congress, see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-6 (1958), and the
commentators, see, e.g., Note, supra note 197, at 610. As the House Report states,
The problem. . . is to provide a procedural screen through which only the desired
cases may pass, and to avoid the wastage of a multitude of fruitless applications to
invoke the amendment contrary to its purpose.
• . . Requirement that the Trial Court certify the case as appropriate for appeal
serves the double purpose of providing the Appellate Court with the best informed
opinion that immediate review is of value, and at once protects appellate dockets
against a flood of petitions in inappropriate cases.
H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1958).
199. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
200. See Note, supra note 197, at 618. Four examples mentioned in the hearings on
§ 1292(b) exemplify these characteristics. See id. at 611-12.
Some courts have suggested that a controlling question of law usually cannot be collat-
eral to the basic issues of the case and that in order to be a controlling question it must be
shown "that resolution of the issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of litiga-
tion in the district court." In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982),
aft'd for absence of quorum sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190
(1983). Neither of these factors, however, necessarily follows from the statutory language.
Indeed, controlling questions may in some circumstances involve peripheral issues. See,
e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(appeal allowed under § 1292(b) with respect to discovery order over claim of executive
privilege because discovery was crucial to withstanding summary judgment motion). More-
over, Congress did not necessarily demonstrate its intent to require an outcome determina-
tive effect when it chose the language "materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation." The Senate Committee Report suggests that the key purpose of the provision
was to "aid in the disposition of cases before the district courts. . . by saving useless expen-
diture of court time." S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5255, 5257.
In the Cement Antitrust case the Ninth Circuit concluded that these purported require-
ments were not satisfied by a grant of a disqualification motion when the district judge's
wife owned stock in a few corporate members of a massive class action. A denial of disqual-
ification, however, may satisfy even the Ninth Circuit's unduly restrictive view. Indeed, a
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"'controlling' means serious to the conduct of the litigation, either
practically or legally."' 20' Another court noted that a procedural deter-
mination that might "importantly affect the conduct of the action"
would be considered controlling as well.2 02
An order denying judicial disqualification does have a fundamen-
tal impact on the further conduct of the case. If the denial was incor-
rect and requires reversal, an entirely new proceeding will be necessary,
involving substantial delay and expense for the parties. Moreover, ef-
fective review on appeal of a final judgment may be impossible to ob-
tain.203 Section 1292(b) also requires, however, that the appeal involve
a legal question, not merely a factual interpretation.204
Once again differentiation between Model I and Model II disqual-
ification cases becomes important. In the proscribed relationship cases
of Model I, substantial questions of interpretation of the disqualifica-
tion statute are likely to arise and will satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 1292(b). For example, consider a judge who is confronted with the
question whether section 455(b)(4) requires his disqualification in a
case involving the electric utility serving the judge's residence. As a
customer, the judge could receive a small amount of money upon judg-
ment against the utility.20 5 If the judge fails to disqualify himself,
either because he interprets the statute to require disqualification only
when there is a substantial financial interest, or because he interprets
the phrase "financial or other interest" to exclude the customer rela-
tionship or contingent interests, he is deciding a legal question that con-
subsequent Ninth Circuit opinion in the Cement case suggests that several other judges of
that court would have allowed an interlocutory appeal. In re Cement Anitrust Litig., 688
F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982), aft'd for absence of quorum sub nom. Arizona v. United
States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983) (court stated it was impressed and persuaded by the
dissent in an earlier Cement proceeding in which the majority denied interlocutory appeal,
but refused to reconsider an issue so recently resolved by another panel in the Circuit).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court was compelled under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2109 to affirm be-
cause four Justices had disqualified themselves and the remaining Justices thought that the
case could not be heard at the next Term of the Court. 459 U.S. at 1191.
201. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974) (paraphrasing Hearings on H.. 6238 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958)).
202. In re Duplan Corp., 591 F.2d 139, 148 n.II (2d Cir. 1978).
203. See supra notes 127, 147-49 & accompanying text.
204. See Note, supra note 197, at 618 n.57. Section 1292(b) is available only in civil
cases. Thus, in criminal cases disqualification orders can be reviewed only under the collat-
eral order doctrine or mandamus.
205. Similar facts were presented in In reVirginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th
Cir. 1976) (holding that review under § 1292(b) and by mandamus were both appropriate).
The court considered the applicability of § 455(b)(4) even though amended § 455 did not
apply retroactively.
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trols the judicial decisionmaking in the case.206 If he is wrong in his
interpretation, immediate review would materially advance the litiga-
tion's ultimate termination by eliminating the requirement for a second
trial. Moreover, this example would also satisfy the requirement in sec-
tion 1292(b) that there be substantial doubt concerning the proper reso-
lution of the legal issue if there were no controlling precedent
establishing the scope of the statute.207
In Model II cases, however, the question is usually whether the
trial judge correctly determined that he was neither actually nor appar-
ently biased. Usually this involves a factual determination; rarely is
the judge interpreting a purely legal issue on which there is substantial
doubt.20 8 Thus, for example, if a judge denied disqualification because
he believes his remarks or actions do not demonstrate bias, review
under section 1292(b) is generally inappropriate.20 9
On occasion, a Model II case may involve a controlling legal ques-
tion: for example, the issue may be whether bias against a party's
counsel satisfies the section 144 requirement of personal bias against a
party.210 Immediate review under section 1292(b) might be appropriate
under these circumstances if the other statutory requirements for re-
view are met, i e., if there are substantial grounds for doubt regarding
the issue and if immediate review might expedite the ultimate resolu-
tion of the case. Nonetheless, in the usual Model II case the trial judge
will simply apply the statute to the facts and make a discretionary de-
termination regarding the existence of bias. Such rulings are generally
206. In Virginia Electric, the judge had disqualified himself and then certified an appeal
under § 1292(b). The Fourth Circuit found that review under § 1292(b) was appropriate
because the trial would be delayed while a new judge became familiar with the complex
litigation. Id. at 364. The court also believed that review of the disqualification by a second
judge after final judgment would be impossible, presumably because improper recusal
would not be a ground for reversal after trial on the merits. Id. at 384. See also In re New
Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980) (allowing § 1292(b) re-
view in case involving similar facts).
207. In Virginia Electric the Fourth Circuit held that the judge's contingent interest of
$70 to $100 in a damages award with recovery spread over 40 years was de minimis and did
not require disqualification under the statute. 539 F.2d at 368.
208. It is, of course, often very difficult to draw the line between questions of law and
questions requiring the application of law to the facts. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 375-83
(1958).
209. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 1976) (dicta).
210. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (review allowed under § 1292(b) of order denying disqualifica-
tion under § 144). See also Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1980) (al-
lowing review under § 1292(b) where the question concerned disqualification due to
apparent bias based on counsel's improper conduct).
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not appropriate for section 1292(b) review.2"l
Although many Model I cases and a few Model II cases will satisfy
the threshold requirements of section 1292(b), the appeals court has the
ultimate and complete discretion to accept or deny an appeal that has
been certified by the trial court.212 Thus, there is a built-in safety valve
to regulate any interference with the proceedings at either the trial or
appellate level that might result from immediate appeal. Although this
may help to appease those whose primary concern is the efficiency of
the court system, it causes a great concern among those who believe
immediate review of judicial disqualification orders is generally neces-
sary to ensure that the judicial system operates and appears to operate
in an impartial fashion. Moreover, the requirement in section 1292(b)
of initial certification by the very trial judge whose impartiality is ques-
tioned makes it unlikely that this route of interlocutory appeal will fre-
quently succeed, especially in Model II bias cases.
Conclusion
Immediate appellate review of trial court decisions denying judi-
cial disqualification is generally warranted in view of the fundamental
importance to our judicial system of preserving both the fact and the
appearance of an impartial judiciary. Review after final judgment of
the case will often be inadequate, and the costs of immediate appellate
review are relatively slight. This Article has utilized a paradigmatic
approach to evaluate the possibilities of immediate review under cur-
rent mechanisms of interlocutory review, focusing on the characteristics
of objective (Model I) and subjective (Model II) bases for disqualifica-
tion and how these characteristics affect the availability of interlocutory
review.
Congress has left to the judiciary the task of determining whether
immediate review of judicial disqualification decisions should be avail-
able. Congress should amend the disqualification statutes to provide
explicitly for immediate review. Pending such congressional action,
however, an analysis of the characteristics of the disqualification mo-
tion involved must guide the judiciary on the issue. It is hoped that this
211. Indeed, it has been suggested that judicial disqualification orders generally are un-
likely to satisfy the controlling question of law requirement. See 13A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER. & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553 at 659 (1984). This
notion ignores the differences outlined in this Article between the Model I and II cases.
Model I cases are likely to present either controlling questions of law or no questions at all,
because discretionary exercises have been largely eliminated by Congress. Model II cases,
however, will usually conform to the above generalization.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also supra note 198.
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approach will lead the appellate courts to permit the use of the various
interlocutory review devices with more frequency, thereby promoting
the ideal of an unquestionably impartial judicial system.
